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Abstract 
Movement in China’s money supply is shown to drive the movement in world money supply over 
the last twenty years. Structural shocks to G3 (U.S., Eurozone and Japan) real M2 and to China’s real 
M2 are both large over 1996:1-2011:12. The cumulative impact of real G3 M2 shocks on real oil 
prices is small and statistically insignificant. In contrast, the cumulative impact of China’s real M2 
on the real price of crude oil is large and statistically significant. Following a sharp fall in real oil 
price in the last half of 2008, the cumulative impact of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil 
is particularly substantial in the recovery of oil price during 2009 from a low of $41.68 for January 
2009. The analysis sheds light on the causes of movement in oil prices over the last twenty five years 
and in assessing the relative importance of China in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil. 
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Liquidity and Crude Oil Prices: China’s Influence Over 1996-2011 
1. Introduction 
The importance of oil price shocks for the functioning of the real economy is well attested. 
Hamilton’s (1983) seminal work connecting oil price shocks with recession and economic slowdown 
in the U.S. has been substantiated and further investigated by Lee et al. (1995), Hamilton (1996; 
2003) and Kilian (2008a; 2009) for the U.S., and by Cologni and Manera (2009), Kilian (2008b), 
Jimenez-Rodriguez and Sanchez (2005) and Cunado and Perez de Garcia (2005) for other countries.1 
In recent years the significance of real oil prices for real activity and the high levels real oil prices 
have attained has led to increased interest on the determinants of movement in real oil price. 
This paper introduces the influence of liquidity in China and in the G3 (U.S., Eurozone and 
Japan) for changes in the real oil price. In the literature increases in global liquidity have been linked 
with increases in aggregate demand and with increases in asset and in commodity prices.
2
 In parallel 
with analysis of the effect of rising liquidity, demand from emerging market countries is identified as 
an important factor influencing oil prices. Hamilton (2011) notes a 6.3% compound annual growth 
rate for petroleum consumption by China since 1998.
3
 Kilian and Hicks (2012) connect real oil price 
increases with strong growth forecasts in emerging economies over 2003-2008 and the decline in real 
oil prices after mid 2008 with forecasts of decline in global growth.  
This paper examines the effect of liquidity in China and in developed economies on the real 
oil price by building on the framework of Kilian (2009) which identifies the supply and demand side 
factors driving oil prices. Barsky and Kilian (2002, 2004) argue that the channels through which 
monetary policy exerts its impact on commodity prices are expectations of stronger economic 
                                                          
1
 Reviews of the literature on the effect of oil shocks on the aggregate economy are provided by Hamilton (2008) and 
Kilian (2008c). 
2
 See for example Darius and Radde (2010) and Brana et al. (2012). Relaxed U.S. monetary policy conditions have been 
linked with high levels of global liquidity (Economist, 11 August 2005) and with domestic asset price appreciation 
(Taylor (2009)). 
3
 Hamilton (2011) provides a review of the oil industry and analyses events influencing oil price and identifies 1997-
2010 as a “new industrial age” characterized by billions of people making the transition from agricultural to industrial 
activity with increases in real income beyond subsistence levels. Hamilton (2009) shows that the oil price increases 
during 2007 and 2008 were due to strong global demand for oil.  
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growth.
4
 The analysis sheds light on the causes of movement in oil prices over the last twenty five 
years and in assessing the relative importance of China in the upsurge of the real price of crude oil. 
Positive innovations to U.S., Japanese and Eurozone liquidity have an insignificant effect on the real 
oil price. In contrast, unanticipated increases in China’s liquidity cause large statistically significant 
increases in real oil prices that persist. Following a sharp fall in the last half of 2008 connected with 
the Global Financial Crisis, real oil price rose strongly over 2009-2010. This rise is associated with 
shocks from China’s liquidity (especially during 2009) and global demand for all industrial 
commodities (especially during 2010).  
Results are found to be robust to a number of considerations, including whether China’s real 
M2 continues to drive real oil price in the presence of China’s real output. Incorporating country-
specific industrial production into our system does not change the finding is that the G3 real M2 has 
a small shock effect on oil prices, while China’s real M2 has a much bigger, dominating, effect on oil 
prices. 
Background information on China’s real M2 and the real M2 of other major countries is 
examined in Section 2. The structural vector autoregressive model for analysis of real crude oil 
prices and liquidity is discussed in Section 3. Data and variables are discussed in Section 4. The 
empirical results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. China M2, Global M2  
The growing importance of China’s money supply for is illustrated in Figure 1. In Figure 1a 
the M2 money supplies in billions of U.S. dollars (USD) in China, U.S., Eurozone, Japan, the U.K. 
                                                          
4
 Barsky and Kilian (2004) show that the substantial increase in industrial commodity prices that preceded the increase in 
oil prices in 1973-1974 is consistent with the view that rising demand based on increased global liquidity (measured by 
money growth in ten industrial economies) drove oil prices higher. Alquist et al. (2010) also discuss this thesis and 
confirm the Gillman and Nakov (2009) findings that monetary factors Granger cause oil prices in the post-war period up 
until 1997. Gillman and Nakov (2009) speculate that Chinese real demand caused the real price of oil to increase at that 
point onwards. Easy monetary policy has been linked to higher commodity prices in Barsky and Kilian (2002) and 
Frankel (2008), although others find no empirical support for such a relationship; see, Frankel and Rose (2010). The 
latter find that the oil price is determined by supply and demand for both stocks and flows of oil. The potential role for oil 
stocks is formally modeled by Alquist and Kilian (201). 
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and Switzerland over 1996:01-2011:12 are presented. In Figure 1b the global M2 in billions of USD 
is shown. Global M2 is taken to be the sum of the M2 in China and in the G3. Throughout the paper 
we take the G3 to be the U.S., Eurozone and Japan.  The rise of China’s money supply as share of 
global money supply has been marked. In 1996 China’s M2 measured in USD only account for less 
than 5% of global M2, however by 2011 this share increased to 28%. In terms of growth rate, 
China’s M2 measure in USD account for 75% of the increase in global M2 registered between 1996 
and 2011. For this reason, the upward trend in global M2 in Figure 1b is due to the behaviour of 
China’s M2. Chinese M2 growth rate has driven global M2 growth since at least 2000. The 
behaviour of China’s nominal GDP is similar to that of China’s nominal M2 and is strongly upward. 
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 1c. From 1996 to 2011 China’s nominal GDP (in USD) increased 
on average by 15% per year and M2 (in USD) increased on average by 19.5% per year.  
The nominal oil price and G3 M2 and China M2 are shown in Figure 1d. In Figure 1d 
China’s M2 is strongly upward and the G3 M2 is much flatter. Nominal China’s M2 trends much 
closer to oil prices than the G3 M2. Given these facts and the argument made by Bodenstein, 
Guerrieri and Kilian (2012; page 51) “… there is consensus that causality in this relationship 
(referring to monetary policy and oil prices) run from the event of oil market to monetary policy as 
well of shifts of monetary policy to the supply of oil and demand of oil in global markets”, we 
believe that a credible hypothesis is the argument that China’s expansive money supply is in part 
responsible for higher oil prices. The sizeable nature of China’s M2 expansion relative to that of the 
G3 is also apparent in real terms. In Figure 1e, China’s real M2 has a much stronger upward trend 
than the G3’s real M2 (the deflator is the U.S.CPI). Based on an index of 100 in 1996, by 2011:12 
China’s real M2 index is 340 and the G3’s real M2 index is 150. 
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3. Methodology 
We use the decomposition of oil price movements into structural shocks due to Kilian (2009). 
In Kilian (2009), changes in the real price of crude oil are decomposed as arising from global oil 
production shocks, shocks to global demand for industrial commodities and a residual, oil market-
specific demand shocks. The latter is associated with precautionary demand shocks specific to the 
crude oil market due to worries about future oil supplies. In this paper we liquidity into the model. If 
liquidity is only a veil over real values, then real M2 in the G3 and in China will not significantly 
influence the real price of oil.  
A structural VAR model (SVAR) is expressed in matrix form as (for simplicity the constant 
term is omitted): 
 0 1 ,
j
t i t i ti
B X B X           (1) 
where j  is the optimal lag length, determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), in this case both criterias select four lags. tX  is vector of 
endogenous variables, and t  is the vector of structural changes, which is serially and mutually 
independent.  
The endogenous variables in the model are: 
[ , , , 3 2 , 2 ],t t t t t tX GO AD RP G M CM     (2) 
where tGO  is percentage change in global oil production, tAD  is global real aggregate demand  
(from Kilian (2009)), tRP  is percentage change in the real price of oil, the nominal price of oil (WTI) 
deflated by the U.S.  Consumer price index (CPI), 3 2tG M  is percentage change in G3 M2 in U.S. 
USD deflated by the CPI, and
 
2tCM  is percentage change in China’s M2 in USD deflated by the 
U.S. CPI.  
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To identify the model restriction are imposed in the      as follows: 
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       ]
 
 
 
 
 
                 (3) 
Model restrictions reflect those in Kilian (2009), while respecting the inclusion of the 
monetary variables in our model. Restrictions are only imposed in the contemporaneous matrix. 
These restrictions are placed using Cholesky decomposition lower triangle matrix shown in equation 
(3) and are motivated as follows.
5
 Shocks to oil production are assumed to not respond to the other 
structural shocks. Oil production only depends on lags of the other variables since it will take some 
time for oil producer to alter production in response to the other shocks. Oil production is unlikely to 
respond to the other shocks within the same month.  
The global real economic activity indicator responds contemporaneously to oil production 
shocks, because the world demand for industrial commodities could be affected immediately by, for 
example, an oil production shortage. However, this indicator is expected to responds with some 
delay to monetary variables and oil prices. The global aggregate demand for industrial commodities 
will not respond to money supply shocks in the same month. Innovations to the real price of oil not 
explained by shocks to oil supply or real aggregate demand will reflect changes in the sector specific 
demand for oil as opposed to changes in the demand for all industrial commodities. 
The identifying restrictions in the system (3) imply that shocks to global oil production and 
global real aggregate demand, and the real oil price will influence real M2 in the G3 and in China, 
and not the reverse. In system (3), shocks to real money supply in the G3 and in China will not 
influence oil supply, real aggregate demand and the real price of oil in the same month. We assume 
that China’s M2 depends contemporaneously on G3 M2. China’s M2 is substantially smaller than G3 
                                                          
5
 For more detail about the Cholesky decomposition see Hamilton (1994; page 87).  
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M2 over most of the sample and China’s lenders and monetary authorities are more likely to see (at 
least in partial data release) contemporaneously global monetary movements (than the opposite).   
 To test for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, the residual serial correlation LM test and 
the VAR residual heteroskedasticity test are carried out. The null hypothesis of both, no serial 
correlation and no heteroskedasticity of the joint combinations of all error term products cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level (respectively). Consequently, the presence of either autocorrelation  and/or 
heteroskedasticity are  discarded. An important condition to be satisfied in any VAR model is that 
the lag structure included also has to be stationary. The inverse roots of AR characteristic polynomial 
test shows that no root lies outside the unit circle, supporting that our models have stable roots.  
 
4. Data and variables 
 Data are monthly data from February 1996 to December 2011 since the M2 series for 
China is only available from January 1996. This starting date also coincides with Hamilton’s (2011) 
structural break analysis. The real oil price is the change in the log of the spot price of Western Texas 
Intermediate (WTI) oil divided by the U.S. CPI. Following Kilian (2009), global oil production is an 
endogenous variable.
6
 The spot price of WTI and global oil production are obtained from the U.S. 
Department of Energy. Global demand for real economic activity is given by Kilian’s (2009) global 
index of dry cargo single voyage freight rates. Some of the advantages of this measure are that it is 
available at a monthly frequency in contrast to real GDP which is only available quarterly and it 
reflects global demand for commodities rather demand within one particular country.
7
  
G3 M2 is constructed by aggregating M2 in USD for the 3 largest economies, the United 
States, the Eurozone and Japan. M2 in each of the G3 is far larger than M2 in any other country over 
                                                          
6
 Global oil production may with time respond to the other variables in the VAR as well as to geopolitical events. For 
example, Kilian (2008a) and Hamilton (2009) identify unrest in Venezuela over December 2002 and January 2003 and 
the second Persian Gulf War over February and March 2003 as disruptive for oil production. 
7
 Monthly global industrial production can be constructed from International Financial Statistics (IMF). However, the 
aggregation of industrial production and the lack of clarity about how this index is constructed make it quite controversial 
as discussed by Kilian (2009). 
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1996-2011 with the exception of China in recent years. China’s M2 is in USD. Use of M2 as 
measure of liquidity is based on the following observations. First, M2 is the only measure of China’s 
money supply going back to 1996. Second, M2 is reported in domestic currency and upon 
conversion to USD is easily aggregated into a global liquidity indicator (without raising issues about 
appropriate weights over time that arise in constructing a global liquidity indicator based on interest 
rates). M2 is deflated by the U.S. CPI. Growth rates in G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 appear in the 
model. Data on M2 are obtained from International Financial Statistics (IMF).  
The assumption of the VAR model requires that all variables in the model must be stationary, 
or that the linear combinations of non-stationary but co-integrated variables must be stationary.
8
 The 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) unit root test reveals that the logarithm of oil production, G3 M2, 
Chinese M2 and oil prices are only first difference stationary. The p-values for the null hypothesis of 
having a unit root are: 0.44, 0.98, 0.99 and 0.77 respectively. The Phillip-Perron (PP) and the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests also suggest use of log first differences. The null 
hypothesis of unit root in the real price of oil cannot be rejected at 76% for monthly data over 
1996:01-2011:12. Kilian’s (2009) indicator of global activity is an index already constructed to be 
stationary. (It is a business cycle index). Consequently, we take log first differences of the variables 
oil production, G3M2, CM2 and oil prices to avoid spurious regression results. 
 
5. Results  
5.1. The structural shocks 
Figure 2 shows the behaviour of the structural shocks to global oil production, global real 
aggregate demand, G3 real M2, China’s real M2 and oil-specific demand, recovered from estimating 
the SVAR in equation (3). The structural shocks are expressed as annual averages. The structural 
shocks change over time. An interesting feature of figure 2 is that global oil supply and aggregated 
                                                          
8
 This is not strictly true, the original VARs of Sims were agnostic and wanted the data to decide. This still works if there 
is sufficient lag structure. 
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demand shocks in the period 1996-2011 are relatively small compared the other shocks. Monetary 
shocks and precautionary shocks are large during this period consistent with the unprecedented 
global monetary expansion observed mainly in China but also observed in Japan and EU. Both the 
G3 real M2 and China real M2 structural shocks are substantial over the last twenty-five years.  
The rapid increase in oil price leading to a peak in June 2008 is associated with positive 
global real aggregate demand, low spare production capacity and oil specific precautionary demand.
9
 
Up to June 2008 structural shocks to G3 real M2 are large and structural shocks to China’s real M2 
are positive, but not as large. The fall in oil price from July 2008 to February 2009 is associated with 
the global financial crisis during late 2008, recession in the U.S. over December 2007 to June 2009, 
and weak growth in Europe. This is reflected in Figure 2 in that the structural shocks global real 
aggregate demand, G3 real M2 and oil specific precautionary demand are negative at the end of 
2008. OPEC decreases production target from September 2008 to January  
 The rise in oil price from January 2009 through April 2011 is associated with large positive 
structural shocks to G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 up through early 2010, positive shocks to global 
real aggregate demand and oil specific precautionary demand starting at the end of 2009 up through 
much of 2010, and global supply shock through late and early 2011. External events at this time 
(2009-2011) include weak recovery from recession in West and strong demand for oil in Asia. 
During 2011 oil production is disrupted in Libya and there is political turmoil in several Middle 
Eastern countries.  
5.2. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks  
Figure 3 shows the responses of the variables in the SVAR to one-standard deviation 
structural innovations. The dashed lines represent a two standard error confidence band around the 
estimates of the coefficients of the impulse response functions.
10
 The first column shows the 
                                                          
9
 In the monthly data, spot prices per barrel for WTI are $58.14 in January 2007 and $140 in June 2008. Spot price for 
WTI is $41.68 in January 2009 and is $133.93 in April 2011. 
10
 The confidence bands are obtained using Monte Carlo integration as described by Sims (1980), where 5000 draws 
were used from the asymptotic distribution of the VAR coefficient. 
10 
 
responses of global oil production, real economic activity, the real price of oil, G3 real M2 and 
China’s real M2 to a structural innovation in global oil production. A supply disruption significantly 
reduces the production of oil that is only partly offset in the first three months. The effect of an 
unanticipated supply disruption on global oil production is very persistent and highly significant.  An 
unanticipated negative innovation in global oil production causes real economic activity to fall for an 
extended period but does not cause a significant effect on the real price of oil. A negative shock 
global oil production does not significantly affect China’s real M2 and is associated with a decline in 
the real G3 M2. 
In the second column of Figure 3 a positive global real activity shock has a persistent positive 
effect on global oil production that builds up to a level that is statistically significant over a 3 to 10 
month window before levelling off. A positive global real activity shock has a persistent effect on 
real oil prices that builds up for several months before starting to decline and is statistically 
significant over the first nine months.
11
 An unanticipated aggregate demand expansion has a very 
persistent and highly significant effect on global real economic activity that rises over time and only 
tends to level off after 20 months. A positive shock to global real activity has a significant negative 
effect on the G3 real M2 for a few months and a positive effect on China’s real M2 that becomes 
statistically significant after seventeen months. 
  The effects of an oil market–specific demand shock are shown in column 3 of Figure 3. A 
positive oil market-specific demand shock has a large and persistent positive effect on the real price 
of oil. This effect is highly statistically significant and rises in magnitude over the first three months 
and then falls only very slowly. Alquist and Kilian (2010) take this overshooting to be consistent 
with models of precautionary demand for oil in which inventories are pre-set and will not adjust 
                                                          
11
 This result is different from the finding by Kilian (2009) for 1973:1-2007:12 in that a positive shock to aggregate 
demand for all industrial commodities resulted in a significant oil price increase that builds up over the first year and then 
is sustained at a large value. The finding that aggregate demand for all industrial commodities has a lesser effect over 
1996:1-2011:12 is not due to the inclusion of M2 variables in the SVAR. For a 3 variable SVAR along the lines of 
Kilian’s (2009) model estimated over 1996:1-2011:12 results in a significant effect of a positive shock to aggregate 
demand for all industrial commodities on real oil price only over the first three months (after which the effect gradually 
erodes). 
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completely to an increase in uncertainty immediately. An oil market–specific demand shock is 
associated with significant positive effects on global real economic activity and global oil 
production. A positive oil market–specific demand shock is linked with a significant decline in G3 
real M2 for about four months and a decline China’s real M2 over an extended period. These 
findings of monetary contraction are consistent with those by Kilian and Lewis (2011) that in 
response to positive innovations in aggregate demand shock and oil market-specific demand there 
are significant and sustained increase in the federal funds rate.
12
 
 In the fifth (fourth) column are shown the responses of global oil production, real economic 
activity, the real price of oil, G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 to a structural innovation in China’s 
(G3) real M2. In response to an unanticipated increase in China’s real M2, there are statistically 
significant and persistent increases in global oil production, global real economic activity and in real 
oil prices. G3 real M2 is not significantly affected by innovations to China’s real M2. An 
unanticipated increase in G3 real M2 does significantly raise global real economic activity and 
China’s real M2. These results underline the fact that for effects on real oil prices it matters where 
the innovation in money is originating. In contrast to the effect of innovations in China’s real M2, an 
unanticipated increase in G3 real M2 does not significantly affect global oil production or real oil 
price. Over 1996:01-2011:12 an innovation in China’s real M2 has significant effects on real oil 
price whereas an innovation in real M2 in the G3 does not. 
5.3. Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil  
The cumulative contribution to the real price of oil of the structural shocks to global oil 
production, global real aggregate demand, oil-specific demand, G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 are 
reported in Figure 4 over 1996:01-2011:12. Figure 4 indicates that the largest cumulative 
contributions to real oil price movement over time are structural shocks to global real aggregate 
                                                          
12
Kilian and Lewis (2011) obtain these findings by adding the federal funds rate as a fourth variable to a Kilian (2009) 
SVAR model for the sample period is 1973.2–2008.6. Kilian and Lewis (2011) find that in response to oil supply 
disruption is a reduction in the federal funds rate. Fan et al. (2011) observe that the central bank of China maintains that 
the money supply is the main monetary tool in China, a view confirmed by the analysis in their paper. 
12 
 
demand, China’s real M2 and oil market-specific demand shocks. The global oil production shocks 
are small in Figure 2 during this period. In Figure 4 the cumulative contribution of oil supply to real 
oil prices is also small during 1996:01-2011:12. Even though the global real aggregate demand 
shocks are also relatively small in figure 2, the cumulative contribution of aggregate demand shocks 
on the real price of crude oil are sometimes large. This maybe because most of the aggregate demand 
shock come from developing economies.  
Monetary shocks are large for both G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 in figure 2. The 
cumulative impact of real G3 M2 shocks on real oil prices in Figure 4 is small. In contrast, the 
cumulative effect of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil is large. The cumulative impact of 
China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil is particularly substantial in the recovery of oil price 
during 2009 and early 2010 from a low of $41.68 for January 2009. The precautionary oil-specific 
demand shocks are very large in Figure 2 and the cumulative impact of oil-specific demand shocks 
on the real oil prices are very large in Figure 4. Oil-specific demand shocks played a role in the rise 
in oil price up to mid-2008 and in the fall in oil price up until January 2009. With oil price rising 
strongly during most of 2009, the effect of oil-specific demand shocks working to lower real oil price 
were overwhelmed by strong effects boosting oil price from China’s real M2 and global real 
aggregate demand shocks.  
5.4. Robustness checks 
Several checks of the robustness of the finding that China’s M2 strongly influences oil price 
whereas shocks to the G3 countries’ M2 do not are reported in this section.  
5.4.1. Measures of global activity 
The Kilian (2009) measure of global real activity is an indicator of global demand for 
shipping commodities. Global industrial production is available as a monthly indicator of global real 
13 
 
activity.
13
 Replacing Kilian’s indicator of global real activity by global industrial production does not 
affect our main results. An attractive characteristic of Kilian’s (2009) measure of global real activity 
(and of global industrial production) is availability at a monthly frequency. This is the advantage 
over the use of global GDP. However, Global GDP is a much broader measure of real activity than 
the global demand for commodities. As an alternative specification of real activity we convert 
quarterly GDP for the largest four economies, the U.S., Eurozone, China and Japan into monthly 
GDP by interpolation of the quarterly data. Global GDP is not available on a quarterly basis, but that 
for the four largest economies is available at a quarterly frequency.
14
 For simplicity and to be 
consistence with our study we aggregate and interpolate the real GDP measured in USD of the U.S., 
Eurozone, China and Japan, to proxy for the global real GDP. These economies account for around 
65% of global GDP in the period studied. We substitute the interpolated real GDP of the four largest 
economies for Kilian’s measure of global real activity. In results not reported the impulse response 
on oil price of one standard deviation shocks to G3 real M2 and China real M2 (with GDP of the four 
largest economies measuring real activity) confirm our previous finding that shocks to China’s real 
M2 has statistically significant and persistent effects on real oil price, whereas shocks to real M2 
expansion in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan do not. 
5.4.2. Country-specific measures of economic activity 
Another potential shortcoming of our model is the absence of country-specific measures of 
economic activity. China’s economic activity could be captured by Chinese M2 and bias our results. 
Does Chinese real M2 continue to drive real oil price in the presence of China’s real output? To 
overcome this issue, we included in our model separately the industrial production of U.S., Euro 
                                                          
13
 This indicator was not our first preference since as discussed by Kilian (2009) there is a lack of clarity about how the 
global industrial production index is constructed. 
 
14
 Miller and Ni (2011) obtained annual global GDP data from Angus Maddison’s historical statistics [Maddison (2010)] 
for 1971–2008 and used quarterly OECD GDP to interpolate global GDP at a quarterly frequency. The aggregation of the 
four largest economies can be obtained quarterly improving significantly the number of original observations in the 
interpolating procedure. 
14 
 
Area, Japan and China as strictly exogenous variables in our system.
15
 Results of this exercise of 
incorporating country-specific industrial production in our system do not show significant change 
from our previous result. The finding is that shocks to the G3 real M2 have a small shock effect on 
oil prices, while shocks to China’s M2 have a much bigger, dominating, effect on oil prices. 
5.4.3. Identification restrictions 
Finally, we test different identification restrictions. We switch the order of the fourth and fifth 
variables in our SVAR system by allowing G3 monetary aggregates to depend contemporaneously of 
Chinese monetary aggregates. Another possible restriction scheme is to use real oil prices as the fifth 
variables in the system allowing monetary aggregates to affect real oil prices contemporaneously. 
Both specifications yielded almost identical results with respect of our original model. The results 
from the robustness checks in this section are available from the authors. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The movement in China’s money supply drives the movement in world money supply over 
the last twenty years. Liquidity in China and in other major countries is introduced into the Kilian 
(2009) model identifying the supply and demand side factors driving real oil price changes. It is 
found that structural shocks to both G3 real M2 and China’s real M2 are large over 1996:1-2011:12. 
However, the cumulative impact of real G3 M2 shocks on real oil prices is small in contrast to a 
large cumulative effect of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil. Following unanticipated 
increases in China’s real M2 growth there are statistically significant increases in real oil prices that 
build up over five months and then persist. In contrast, innovations to U.S., Japanese and Eurozone 
real M2 do not significantly affect real oil price.  
The results show that increased liquidity in China relative to that in the U.S., Eurozone and 
Japan significantly raises real oil prices over 1996:1-2011:12. Following a sharp fall in the real oil 
                                                          
15
 Meaning that these four variables enter only in the right-hand-side all equations. The variables are also expressed in 
log-first difference form as there are first-difference stationary.     
15 
 
price in the last half of 2008, the cumulative impact of China’s real M2 on the real price of crude oil 
is particularly substantial in the recovery of oil price during 2009 from a low of $41.68 for January 
2009. Results are robust to a number of considerations. The incorporation of country-specific 
industrial production into our system does not change the finding is that China’s real M2 has a large 
bigger, dominating, influence on real oil prices. The analysis sheds light on the causes of movement 
in oil prices over the last twenty five years and in assessing the relative importance of China in the 
upsurge of the real price of crude oil. 
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Figure 1a. Money supplies (Billions of USD) in China, U.S., Eurozone, Japan, U.K. and Switzerland: 
1996:01-2011:12  
 
 
Figure 1b. Global (G3 plus China) money supply in billions of USD: 1996:01-2011:12 
 
 
Figure 1c. China’s nominal GDP (billions) and money supply (billions of USD): 1996:01-2011:12 
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Figure 1d. Price of oil and G3 and China’s money supplies (billions of USD): 1996:01-2011:12 
 
 
Figure 1e. G3 (U.S., Eurozone, Japan) and China Real M2: 1996:01-2011:12 
  
Notes: Global M2 is taken to be the sum of the M2 in China and in the G3. The G3 is taken to be the U.S., Eurozone and 
Japan. 
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Figure 2. The Evolution of the Structural Shocks: 1996:01-2011:12 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is aggregate demand shock, RP is real oil price, G3M2 is M2 of G3 countries, and 
CM2 is China’s M2. 
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Figure 3. The impulse response effects of the structural shocks: 1996:01-2011:12  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is aggregate demand shock, RP is real oil price, G3M2 is M2 of G3 countries, and 
CM2 is China’s M2. 
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Figure 4. Cumulative effect of structural shocks on real price of oil (annual averages) 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: GO is global oil production, AD is aggregate demand shock, RP is real oil price, G3M2 is M2 of G3 countries, and 
CM2 is China’s M2. 
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